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AVE DEFAMATION, ATQUE VALE LmEL AND SLANDER 
Francis D. Murnaghan, Jr.t 
Two recent decisions by the Maryland Court of Appeals 
have brought about substantial changes in the law of libel 
and slander. The author considers the consequences of these 
decisions, welcoming the abolition of certain distinctions 
between written and spoken defamation as well as the 
adoption of new rules pertaining to recoverable damages. 
The author, however, expresses reservations as to pro-
nouncements in the decisions that purport to impose new 
burdens on the plaintiff to establish liability. 
No area of the law is "as bewildering in its contradictions, as 
involved in its reasoning, as mercurial in its changes, as rich in 
.anomalies and anecdotes as the law of libel and slander."l The 
Maryland Court of Appeals has referred to the thickets of the law 
-of libel and described the underbrush as "tangled"2 and "nearly 
impassable."3 
The entry by the United States Supreme Court into the field of 
·defamation has served only to increase the confusion.4 Bent upon 
·.protecting first amendment freedom of expression from the chilling 
,effects of judgments against publishers in substantial amounts, in 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan5 the Court established a rule pro-
lhibiting liability where the plaintiff is a public official or public 
t A.B., 1941, Johns Hopkins University; LL.B., 1948, Harvard University; Assist-
ant Attorney General, 1952-54; Partner, Venable, Baetjer and Howard; Member 
of the Baltimore City, Maryland State and American Bar Associations. 
1. M. ERNST & A. LINDY, HOLD YOUR TONGUE 6 (1932). 
2. Fennell v. G.A.Co Finance Corp., 242 Md. 209, 218 A.2d 492 (1966) . 
.3. I d. at 218, 218 A.2d at 496. The analogy has recently been expanded in Eaton, 
The American Law of Defamation through Gertz 'U. Robert Welch, Inc. and 
Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349, 1350-56 (1975): 
From those seeds the English common law of defamation slowly grew 
into a forest of complexities, overgrown with anomalies, inconsistencies and 
perverse rigidities. It became thicketed with brambled traps for innocent 
defendants, crisscrossed with circuitous paths and dead ends for seriously 
wronged plaintiffs, and enshrouded in a "fog of fictions, inferences, and 
presumptions." This perplexing creation of the common law was trans-
planted into the United States, where its complexities multiplied in the 
state legislatures and courts, and its inconsistencies grew multifoliate in 
the variety of soils provided by federalism . • • . 
Very little of this labyrinthine forest makes sense when examined 
closely, and legal writers have had few kind words for it. 
4. Prior to 1964, the Supreme Court had repeatedly acknowledged that defamation 
was a common law area and, as such, the exclusive prerogative of state courts. 
See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957); Beauharnais v. 
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); Near v. Minnesota ex rei. Olson, 283 U.S. 
697, 709 (1931); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897). 
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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figure, unless he can prove, by evidence of convincing clarity, know-
ing falsity or reckless disregard of the truth by the defendant.6 
Thus, even where language is clearly false and defamatory, the 
public official or public figure plaintiff must show a high degree 
of probability that "the defendant in fact entertained serious 
doubts as to the truth of his publication."7 
Expectably, the cases have concerned primarily publications by 
members of the news media or others intimately involved in dis-
cussion of public affairs. While Sullivan and subsequent cases es-
tablished the standards concerning public officials and public figures~ 
only recently did the Court deal with the question of what degree 
of immunity is to be enjoyed by a publisher where the subject is 
a matter of public interest, but the plaintiff is simply a private 
individual caught up in a newsworthy event.8 
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia Inc.,9 the Court suggested that 
such individuals were to be subject to the same stringent standards 
as those imposed upon public officials or public figures.10 However, 
in Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc. ll and Time Inc. v. Firestone,12 the 
6. See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Cantrell v. 
Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) ; Old Dominion Branch No. 496, 
Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974); Rosenbloom 
v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 
401 U.S. 295 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971) ; Monitor Patriot 
Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 
398 U.S. 6 (1970) ; Pickering v. Board of EdUc., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) ; St. Amant 
v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 
U.S. 81 (1967); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Time, Inc. 
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Linn v. 
Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 
356 (1965); Garrison v. Louisiana. 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
7. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). 
8. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). 
9. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
10. The plaintiff in Rosenbloom was a distributor of nudist magazines. He was 
arrested under obscenity laws as he was delivering magazines to a newsstand. 
Plaintiff's home and business storage facilities were lawfully searched. The 
police informed the news media of the arrest and the defendant's radio station 
then broadcast repeatedly a news report declaring "[c]ity cracks down on smut 
merchants" and concluding with a description of the plaintiff as "a main dis-
tributor of obscene materia!." 
Subsequent broadcasts related to an effort by the plaintiff to secure injunc-
tive relief against police interference with his business and against further pub-
licity about his earlier arrests. Those broadcasts referred to the plaintiff and his 
business associates as "smut distributors" and "girlie-book peddlers" and char-
acterized the plaintiff's suit as an effort to reduce pressure on "the smut liter-
ature racket." 
Although the plaintiff was a private individual, the public interest in the 
events in which he was involved was very great. I d. 
11. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
12. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). 
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Supreme Court drew back and took a somewhat different direction. 
In Gertz, which again involved a media defendant and a publication 
concerning a matter of wide public interest, the Supreme Court 
announced that private individuals would have a less heavy burden 
than public officials or public figures insofar as establishing lia-
bility for defamation was concerned. IS The Court did, however, 
substantially restrict previous common law concepts as to recover-
able damages. The Court determined that the first amendment 
guarantee of free press, as extended to the states by the fourteenth 
amendment,14 did not allow presumed general damages or punitive 
damages, at least in the absence of proof of knowing falsity or 
reckless disregard of truth by the defendant. 
Since Gertz and Firestone each involved a media defendant, 
and the articles for which suits were brought dealt with matters 
of public interest, it was arguable that, in circumstances of purely 
private defamation, i.e., in cases where there was no public interest 
in the utterances,I5 the existing common law as to recoverable 
damages was not changed. 
The question arose almost immediately in Maryland. In Sindorf 
v. Jacron Sales CO.I6 and General Motors Corp. v. Piskor,l1 two-
cases dealing with slander uttered in purely private contexts, the 
court of special appeals held that Gertz did not limit application 
of common law principles in cases of purely private defamation. 
The court of appeals reached a significantly different conclusion.ls 
It determined that, whether or not the constitutional rights of free 
speech and free press compel the result, as a matter of enlightened 
state law all private plaintiffs will be subject to the rules an-
nounced in Gertz. In J acron, the court expressed concern over the 
intricacies of differing sets of rules for (a) public official and public 
figure plaintiffs, (b) private individual plaintiffs caught up in mat-
13. Firestone followed Gertz on the point. 
14. See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938). 
15. The fact that something appears in the news media does not necessarily establish 
that it is something of public interest. Certainly any such rule, if established 
in connection with limitations on rights to recovery, would exalt the press in a 
way the courts have been most IQathe to do. See, e.g., Negley v. Farrow, 60 Md. 
158, 177, 45 Am. Rep. 715 (1883): ''The fact that one is the proprietor of a 
newspaper, entitles him to no privilege in this respect, not possessed by the com-
munity in general." ct. Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 592, 350 A.2d 
688,695 (1976). 
Nevertheless, a matter is all the more likely to be private and not of general 
public interest where its utterance has not been in a newspaper or in a radio or 
television broadcast. 
16. 27 Md. App. 53, 341 A.2d 856 (1975) (remarks by a representative of plaintiff's 
former employer to plaintiff's new employer). 
17. 27 Md. App. 95, 340 A2d 767 (1975) (employee detained at end of shift in 
the sight of his fellows for questioning about possible pilferage). 
18. Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976) ; General Motors 
Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165,352 A.2d 810 (1976). 
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ters of general or public interest, and (c) private individual plain-
tiffs in situations not imbued with a general or public interest. To 
counteract this proliferation of varying sub-species of defamation 
law, the court of appeals ruled that Gertz would apply to all private 
individual plaintiffs even· in cases where the communication com-
plained of was not a matter of general or public interest, and 
whether or not such a rule was required to conform to the consti-
tutional guarantees of , free speech and free press.19 
The extension of Gertz to purely private defamation represents 
a most positive step in tlw area of damages. The common law has 
been plagued by twolInsatisfactory concepts of damages. One 
allows a plaintiff to recover too much; the other allows him to 
recover too little. Gen,er~l damages, which have been permitted 
in libel cases20 and cases of slander per se,21 are whatever the jury 
- :.t j,' ' 
19. It may . someday provide an interesting and instructive insight into the counter-
balancing exercise kno,,\rn as judicial decision-making, if the Supreme Court 
should decide that Ge,..iz has no application to purely private defamation, leaving 
the states free to continue application of common law principles, especially those 
permitting award of speculatjve. presumed general damages. The Maryland 
Court of Appeals would'then, despite what it has said in Jacron and Piskor, be 
free to reinstate the old. commori law rules. It seems unlikely that it would do so, 
however. It probably will depend on the nature of the particular case in which 
the question arises. '. . . ' 
It is not altogether clear ~hether the Supreme Court in Gertz, in fact, 
thought that it was laying down rules for all defamation, even purely private 
defamation involving n~~her a ·matter of public interest nor a media defendant 
Even less clear is wnether, if the Court so intended, it would actually extend 
Gertz to such a situation if a case presenting an appropriate factual background 
for such a decision were to reach it 
The commentators are' not precise or entirely harmonious, though, in 
general, they appear to 'take the Gertz opinion at face value, as applying to all 
defamation. E.g., Eaton;, The American Law of Defamation through Gertz'll. 
Robert Welch, Inc. and, Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349, 
1414, 1449 (1975); Rosenberg, The New Law of Political Libel: A Historical 
Perspective, 28 RUTGERS L. REv. 1141, 1173 (1975); INote, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 
960, 974-76 (1975). But see Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: 
In Praise of Gertz'll. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEXAS L. REv. 199, 216, 217 (1976). 
20. There is an unresolved controversy as to whether general damages were re-
coverable for all libel, (whether the defamatory nature of the language was 
evident on its face or not) or whether, when extrinsic facts were necessary to 
establish a defamatory meaning for words otherwise innocent or ambiguous, only 
special damages could be recovered. See Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. 
REV. 839 (1960) ; PROSSER, More Libel Per Quod, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1629 (1966) ; 
Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod, 79 HARv. L. REv. 733 (1966); 
Eldredge, Variation on; Libel Per Quod, 25 VAND. L. REv. 79 (1972); Mur-
naghan, From Figment to Fiction to Philosophy - The Requirement of Proof 
01 Damages in Libel Actions, 22 CATH. L. REv. 1 (1972) [hereinafter referred 
to as Murnaghan]; Sauerhoff v. Hearst Corp., 388 F. Supp. 117, 120-21 (D. 
Md. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, No. 75-1229 (4th Cir., June 10, 1976); 
General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 27 Md. App. 95, 117, 119, 124, 340 A.2d 767, 782, 
783, 786 (1975), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 277 Md. 165, 352 A.2d 810 (1976). 
See also Picone v. TalbQtt, 29 Md. App. 536, 544, 349 A.2d 615, 619-20 (1975), 
which asserts that, for slander also, general damages may be recovered only 
when the defamation is evident on the face of the language. That would appear 
to be a case of Homer nodding. Murnaghan, supra at 14; General Motors Corp. 
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chooses to allow, even in the absence of any proof of harm actually 
suffered.22 Special damages are recoverable in cases of slander 
per quod or libel per quod. Such damages are restricted to pe-
cuniary loss and omit other significant elements of actual damages, 
particularly the plaintiff's provable loss of reputation, the loss of 
society of others, and the injury to his feelings demonstrably and 
foreseeably growing out of the publication.23 
In the place of these two unsatisfactory measures of compensa-
tory damages, the court of appeals has substituted the superior 
measure of actual damages, i.e., all provable harm, whether pe-
cuniary or not, reasonably and foreseeably arising from an action-
able defamation whether oral or written. 
Thus, the court of appeals has effectively eliminated the un-
warranted distinction between libel and slander.24 The distinction 
is peculiar to the Anglo-American common law and owes its 
existence to an arbitrary resolution of the seventeenth century 
problem of how to reconcile separate bodies of defamation law, 
one (libel) deriving from the Star Chamber, the other (slander) 
deriving from the activities of the King's judges in assimilating 
v. Piskor, 'Zl Md. App. 95, 124, 340 A2d 767, 786 (1975), aff'd in pari, re?1'd in 
pari, 'Zl7 Md. 165, 352.A2d 810 (1976). 
21. Those involving charges of (a) crime, (b) unfitness for one's trade, calling 
or profession, (c) loathsome disease, or (d) unchastity of a female. General 
Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 'Zl Md. App. 95, 117, 34OA2d 767, 782 (1975). The 
current tidal wave sweeping away all distinctions between the sexes has not ex-
panded the definition of slander per se to include . imputations of unchastity to 
a male. Sauerhoff v. Hearst Corp., 388 F. Supp. 117, 125 (D. Md. 1974), re?1'd 
on other grounds, No. 75-1229 (4th Cir., June 10, 1976); ct. Revisor's Note to 
MD. ANN. CoDE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-501 (1975), suggesting that failure 
to extend the definition to protect men constitutes discrimination. 
22. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF DAMAGES § 120 (1935): 
Apart from the occasional traceable money loss recovered as special dam-
ages, damages in defamation cases are measurable by no standard which. 
different men can use with like results. 
See also C. MAYNE, ON DAMAGES 500 (11th ed. 1946); 4 J. SUTHERLAND, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 1206 (4th ed. 1916); Note, Libel and Ihe 
Corporate Plaintiff, 69 CoLUM. L. REv. 1496, 1511 (1969) ("[P]resumptive dam-
ages .•• permit an excessive, wholly speculative verdict."). 
23. See Murnaghan, supra note 20, at 2. . 
The hypertechnicality of what falls within and what falls without the 
classification "special damages" is aptly illustrated by the recent holding in 
Picone'll. Talbott,29 Md. App. 536, 544, 349 A2d 615, 620 (1975), that "there 
were special damages proven in the nature of medical bills for treatment of a 
condition which could have been partially attributable to the slander .••• " Rea-
sonable as that may sound, it flies in the face of two earlier decisions, neither 
of which is alluded to in the Picone opinion: Shafer v. Ahalt, 48 Md. 171 (1878) 
(a sickness resulting from the utterance of words is not a proper element of 
special damages); Sauerhoff v. Hearst Corp., 388 F. Supp. 117, 122 (D. Md. 
1974), re?1'd on other grounds, No. 75-1229 (4th Cir., June 10, 1976) (impair-
ment of plaintiff's health excluded from special damages). 
24. "Gertz • .• [applies] to cases of slander and libel alike •••• " General Motors 
Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 171, 352 A.2d 810, 814 (1976). . 
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the law originating in the ecclesiastical courts.25 The distinction 
between libel and slander has been recognized as indefensible.26 
The court of appeals is to be commended for having put an awkward 
anomaly to rest. 
Similarly, the many confusions relating to the measure of re-
covery, depending on whether words are defamatory per se or 
per quod, no longer have any substantial relevance or importance.27 
Actual damages will be uniformly recoverable for all actionable 
defamation, whether spoken or written, and whether or not the 
derogatory content is unambiguously apparent from the publication 
itself. 
On the damages side, therefore, the court of appeals has done 
much to hack away the tangled and nearly impassable underbrush. 
Theoretically, the questionable rules relating to general damages 
might still have restricted vitality, since Gertz, Jacron and Piskor 
all indicate that general damages, as well as punitive damages, still 
may be recoverable if the plaintiff makes an adequate showing of 
what has come to be known as "constitutional malice,"28 i.e., know-
ing falsity or reckless disregard of the truth by the defendant. 
Cases in which plaintiffs have succeeded in making an adequate 
showing of knowing falsity or reckless disregard of truth are, 
25. See Cheek v. J.B.G. Properties, Inc., 28 Md. App. 29, 31, 344 A.2d 180, 183 
(1975); 1 A. HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS 2-4 (1%9). 
26. Grein v. LaPoma, 54 Wash. 2d 844, 340 P.2d 766 (1959); Prosser, Libel Per 
Quod, 46 VA. L. REv. 839 (1960). 
27. Defamation-by-extrinsic-fact is what in recent cases the Maryland Court of 
Appeals and Court of Special Appeals have come to refer to as libel per quod 
and slander per quod. The use of that language is inexact and reflects a mis-
conception. See Murnaghan, supra note 20. Slander per qltod was the termi-
nology for oral defamation for which special damages had to be pleaded and 
proven. Cheek v. J.B.G. Properties, Inc., 28 Md. App. 29, 33, 344 A.2d 180, 184 
(1975). Slander per se concerned oral statements in the four categories for 
which general, presumed damages were recoverable, whether or not extrinsic 
facts were needed to establish the slander. Properly, all libel was libel per se, 
whether or not extrinsic facts were required. Over the years, however, libel 
per quod has come to be a term employed for written words whose defamatory 
nature can only be shown through extrinsic facts, and the courts have manufac-
tured a requirement that special damages be shown where the libelous nature of 
the words is not evident on their face. Although such confusion between what 
is actionable without proof of damages, and what is patently defamatory had not 
theretofore spilled over from libel to slander, it did so in the recent case 
of Picone v. Talbott, 29 Md. App. 536, 544, 349 A.2d 615, 620 (1975) ; ct. Ameri-
can Stores Co. v. Byrd, 229 Md. 5, 12-13, 181 A.2d 333, 337 (1962). But see 
General Motors Corp. v.Piskor, 27 Md. App. 95, 119, 340 A.2d 767, 783 (1975), 
aff'd in part, re'lld in part, 277 Md. 165, 352 A.2d 810 (1976). Because of the 
very different meanings which the cases have assigned for different purposes to 
the term defamation per quod, in this article the phraseology is avoided and 
"defamation-by-extrinsic-fact" is employed. 
As is noted subsequently, the distinction between defamation per se and 
defamation per quod in the latter day, substantially altered connotations given to 
those phrases may still playa vital role in developing rules to determine liability. 
28. General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 174, 352 A.2d 810, 816 (1976). 
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however, extremely rare.29 If the question is presented to the court 
in that restricted context, it is to be hoped that the court will 
recognize the essential identity of general damages and punitive 
damages and outlaw the former as redundant or perhaps as a 
denial of equal protection to the defendant.30 
In contrast to the work of the court in eliminating the un-
warranted distinction between libel and slander and in adopting 
improved rules for recoverable damages, the decisions in J acron 
and Piskor present several uncertainties in the liability area which 
can be resolved only on a case-by-case basis in the future. 
Responding to the statements in Gertz that liability without 
fault may not be imposed on a defamation action defendant, the 
court established a requirement that negligence be proven by the 
plaintiff. In doing so, the Maryland court followed the lead of the 
American Law Institute's Tentative Draft No. 21, Restatement 
(Second) of Torts (April 5, 1975). In proposed §580B, the ALI Re-
porter, in dealing with liability for defamation of a private person, 
has restricted his inquiry to the developments at the Supreme 
Court level from Sullivan through Gertz.31 The Reporter has 
29. Out of a legion of cases since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan was decided in 
1964, only a handful have resulted in ultimate success for plaintiffs: Curtis Pub-
lishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Goldwater v. Ginsberg, 414 F.2d 324 
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970), rehearing denied, 397 U.S. 
978 (1970) ; Field Research Corp. v. Patrick, 30 Cal. App. 3d 603, 106 Cal. Rptr. 
473 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 922 (1973); Cantrell v. Forest City Publish-
ing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974); Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 
674 (W. Va.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975). 
30. See Justice Marshall's opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 
83 (1971), in which he observed that the effect of permitting an award of gen-
eral damages "is to give the jury essentially unlimited discretion and thus give 
it much the same power it exercises under the labels of punitive or exemplary 
damages." The criminal, i.e., punitive, nature of a libel recovery of general 
damages is alluded to in Cheek v. I.B.G. Properties, Inc., 28 Md. App. 29, 31, 
344 A.2d 180, 183 (1975); cf. Murnaghan, supra note 20, at 12 n.41. Hence, 
punitive damages, by themselves, serve the objectives of general damages, and it 
is inappropriate to allow what are, in effect, two awards for the same thing. 
Maryland law is clear that, to support punitive damages, there must be 
proof of additional considerations over and beyond the evidence necessary to 
support the recovery of compensatory damages. E.g., Heinze v. Murphy, 180 
Md. 423, 429, 24 A.2d 917, 921 (1942): "The allowance of exemplary damages 
must be justified by circumstances of aggravation." That general rule would be 
contradicted if the same quantum of proof would permit recovery of compensa-
tory general damages and also punitive damages. To single out defamation de-
fendants for such treatment, contrary to that afforded defendants in all other 
tort actions, would appear to constitute a denial of equal protection. 
That general damages will not be available, even where knowing falsity or 
reckless disregard of truth is established, is strongly suggested by the Caveat 
to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 621 (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975). The 
Institute refrains from taking any position on the matter, despite the language 
in Gertz to the effect that presumed damages as well as punitive damages will 
be recoverable on a showing of constitutional malice. 
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Forward at vii-viii (Tent. Draft No. 21, 
1975). 
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displayed a love of logic and symmetry, and has attempted to 
construct a step-by-step approach. Unfortunately, it would appear 
that he has not considered some things that must be covered by the 
posited rules. 
The Reporter has drawn from Sullivan and the cases expanding 
its doctrine what he believes is an initial rule of liability. In situ-
ations where it applies, the Reporter concludes, a plaintiff, to make 
out defamation, must prove (a) knowing falsity and knowledge 
by the defendant that the language defames the plaintiff, or (b) 
the substantial equivalent of intent, reckless disregard of these 
matters. Apparently relying on the similarity between recklessness 
and gross negligence, the Reporter then moves down two separate 
flights of stairs as though they were one, concluding that, since 
negligence is the next step down from recklessness and private 
individuals are on the step below that occupied by public officials 
and public figures, negligence must be the appropriate liability 
requirement in defamation cases by private individuals. 
In the first place, this ignores the consideration that New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan deals, not with a rule as to what constitutes 
the tort in the first place, but with a privilege defense grounded 
on the Constitution, applicable where language may be and usually 
is manifestly defamatory, demonstrably false, and actionable but 
for the privilege. 
In the second place, the Reporter would appear to have taken 
some liberties with his sources. The cases in the Supreme Court 
have not as yet been concerned with the problems of seemingly 
innocent language made derogatory by reference to extrinsic facts 
or language not on its face pertaining to the plaintiff, but made 
applicable to him in the minds of readers or listeners by special 
circumstances known to them. 
Even if it might be said that the cases do impose restrictions 
on such defamation-by-extrinsic-fact, such a consideration would 
not justify a logical leap to the point where a private plaintiff, 
even in a case of patent defamation, as a matter of establishing 
primary liability, must show negligence on the defendant's part 
in not ascertaining defamatory nature and falsity. The Gertz case, 
dealing with private persons, is essentially unlike New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan. In bold contradiction to what was the holding in 
Sullivan, the Supreme Court in Gertz said that there is no consti-
tutional privilege related to liability, other than a minimal bar 
against liability without fault - a prohibition against recovery 
generally applicable with very few exceptions. At most, the risk of 
liability without fault is confined to cases of defamation-by-ex-
trinsic-fact, where the publisher may not have had any idea that he 
was defaming. 
1976] Defamation 35 
However, most defamation is apparent from the face of the 
language. There is no basis for using negligence as a criterion 
in ascertaining whether liability exists when a defendant calls 
a plaintiff a thief. The allocation to the judge, not the jury,32 
of the determination of whether words are actionable is strong 
indication that the question is not one of negligence. Nor does it 
become liability without fault for a rule of law to say that calling 
a person a thief is, without more, actionable. Mankind has con-
cluded, over and over again, that such reputation-damaging ac-
tivity is presumptively wrong, and has placed on the defendant the 
burden of showing that he had a justifiable reason for such ap-
parently improper conduct. Interestingly, Firestone, coming after 
Gertz, appears to accept that a state rule making it wrong to utter 
words defamatory on their face, even without a determination of 
negligence, would satisfy Gertz. The concern of the Firestone ma-
jority was solely with the fact that no Florida court had ade-
quately stated that the defamation, discernible from the face of the 
publications, was a wrong under Florida law. Firestone did not 
hold that a finding of negligence was requisite. 
However questionable the ALI foundation for its delineation 
of the new common law of defamation may have been, the Maryland 
Court of Appeals apparently accepted the ALI approach. As the 
Maryland court announced the rule, it would seem to apply to 
every case. Bearing in mind the nature of the normal defamation 
action, however, that could hardly have been intended. 
It is the usual practice of the pragmatic common law to develop 
and refine principles on a case-by-case basis. Experience has taught 
that attempts to go beyond the facts of the instant case, to legislate 
in 'Vacuo, inevitably lead to revisions when future actual fact situa-
tions arise to which the broad statements must be applied. Ad-
mittedly, the situation prompted by the revolutionary decision by 
the Supreme Court in Gertz and the attempt of the ALI to pontifi-
cate, rather than restate the principles announced in actual cases, 
was unusual. Nevertheless, it should be appreciated that the an-
nouncements of rules of liability in Jacron and Piskor are all 
dicta, and thus tentative, awaiting the test of application in specific 
cases.33 
32. See, e.g., Cheek v. J.B.G. Properties, Inc., 28 Md. App. 29, 33, 344 A2d 180, 
184 (1975). 
33. In both lacron and Piskor, the defendants established the existence of common 
law qualified privileges. Under long established law, that shifted the burden to 
the plaintiff to prove falsity, relieving the defendant of the burden of proving 
truth. See, e.g., Hollander v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 
96, 102, 104 (D. Md. 1973); Orrison v. Vance, 262 Md. 285, 294, 277 A2d 573, 
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A general rule that negligence is an essential component of a 
plaintiff's prima facie case in an action for defamation simply 
will not pass the test of application on a case-by-case basis. 
Defamation by and large involves an intentional rather than a 
negligent publication of derogatory material.s4 To say that a man 
is a thiefs5 does not display negligence. It may be done with 
impunity if (a) the statement is true or (b) the circumstances 
are privileged, that is to say, where the making of the statement 
serves an acceptable interest even if untrue. An obvious example 
of such a qualified privilege occurs when a newspaper accurately 
quotes a statement in court by one party about another party. 
The public interest in the administration of justice renders priv-
ileged a correct quotation of a remark made in court, even if plainly 
defamatory and even if untrue.S6 
For present purposes, the crucial consideration is that utterance 
of words defamatory on their face is an intentional rather than a 
577 (1971); Wetherby v. Retail Credit Co., 235 Md. 237, 242-43, 201 A.2d 344, 
347 (1964); Coffin v. Brown, 94 Md. 190, 195, 50 A. 567, 569 (1901); Fresh v. 
Cutter, 73 Md. 87, 92, 20 A. 774, 775 (1890). 
It remains for another day, therefore. to determine whether, absent a 
privilege, the plaintiff must prove falsity. 
Similarly, the existence of the qualified privileges established a burden on 
the plaintiff to prove something greater than negligence, i.e., actual malice. 
Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 599,350 A.2d 688, 699 (1976). Hence, 
it was not necessary to the decision of either Jacron or Piskor to decide whether, 
in unprivileged situations, negligence must be proven by the plaintiff. 
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975), recognizes that 
negligence is not the only fault which may be involved when defamation is 
uttered. Proposed comment b to § 580B states: "A person who harms another 
by publishing a false defamatory communication concerning him may have 
intended the result, may have been either reckless or negligent in bringing it 
about, or may have been without fault in this regard." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 580B, comment b (Tent Draft No. 21, 1975). 
1 A. HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS 58 (1969), puts it categorically: 
"Defamation is an intentional tort." ct. H&R Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 
Md. 36, 48-49, 338 A.2d 48, 55 (1975) (differentiating negligence from such in-
tentional torts as libel, slander and malicious prosecution) ; Parker v. Brattan, 120 
Md. 428, 434, 87 A. 756, 758 (1913) (holding a slander judgment not discharge-
able in bankruptcy, because of the exception for "wilful and malicious injuries"). 
35. Such a statement is clearly defamatory per se as charging a crime for which 
corporal punishment may be imposed. A charge of stealing was assumed to be 
defamatory per se in both Jacron Sales Co. v. SiOOorf, 276 Md. 580, 583, 350 
A.2d 688,690 (1976) and General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 352 A.2d 
810 (1976) ; see Newton v. Spence, 20 Md. App. 126, 129, 137, 316 A.2d 837, 839, 
843-44 (1974) ; Wheatley v. Wallis, 3 H.&J. 38 (1810) ; but as proof that nothing 
is certain in defamation, see Wolf v. Rodifer, 1 H.&J. 409 (1803) (probably 
explainable on grounds of variance between pleading and proof). 1 J. POE, 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 176 (6th ed. 1970). The statutorily prescribed form 
for an action of slander previously contained in MD. ANN. CODE art. 75, § 14, 
Law of March 6, 1856, ch. 112, [1856] Laws of Md. 139 (repealed 1973) used, 
as an example, the assertion: "he is a thief," indicating a legislative belief that 
the words are defamatory. 
36. Evening News Co. v. Bowie, 154 Md. 604, 611-12, 141 A. 416, 419 (1928) ; McBee 
v. Fulton, 47 Md. 403, 417, 426 (1878). 
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negligent act, and, in general, negligence considerations would 
seem properly to play no part in determining liability. 
There is, however, one restricted area of defamation (i.e., libel 
or slander-by-extrinsic-fact) where negligence principles do come 
into play. It may well develop, as cases are decided one by one and 
the outline of the principle is pragmatically filled out, that it is only 
to this restricted area that the court of appeals was addressing 
itself when it stated that negligence must be demonstrated by the 
plaintiff.37 Sometimes words are completely innocent or ambiguous 
on their face, yet convey a plainly defamatory meaning to some re-
cipients because there are extrinsic facts which impart a special 
meaning to the words. 
The leading case38 concerning such a situation involved a photo-
graph appearing in the section of a newspaper devoted to social 
events. A picture was taken at a race meeting of a dashing military 
type and his charming female companion. The caption for the photo-
graph identified the two persons as engaged to be married. The 
officer told the newspaper that his companion was his fiancee. In 
fact, the gentleman had a wife whom he had left at home on racing 
day. The wife sued on the theory that those in possession of the 
extrinsic facts that she was occupying a common residence with 
the "gentleman" and holding herself out as his wife read the article 
as describing her as a fallen woman, actually living in sin although 
pretending to be his wife. 
In a two to one decision, the English court of appeals held the 
newspaper liable, even though the publisher did not know and 
could not reasonably have known the extrinsic facts which rendered 
innocent words defamatory. The case has been cited for the propo-
sition that a publisher is the guarantor of the accuracy of his 
statements and is recognized as an instance of liability without 
fault.39 There is considerable doubt that the doctrine has received 
or would receive endorsement from American courts.40 
37. [The first appellate case to be decided after the court of appeals' pronouncements 
in !acron and Piskor involved defamation-by-extrinsic-fact, and so the remand 
for trial in accordance with those pronouncements does not extend them to words 
plainly defamatory on their face. Stephens v. Dixon, 30 Md. App. 56, 351 A2d 
187 (1976). The same considerations apply to Food Fair Stores, Inc. fl. Lascola, 
31 Md. App. 153, 355 A.2d 757 (1976), where the alleged slander concerned am-
biguous words not defamatory in and of themselves, without reference to ex-
trinsic facts. 
38. Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers, Ltd., [1929] 2 K.B. 331, 69 A.L.R 720. 
39. Henn, "Libel-By-Extrinsic-Fact," 47 CoRNELL L.Q. 14, 46-47 (1961) [herein-
after referred to as Henn]; Paton, Reform and the English La'lJl of Defamation, 
33 ILL. L. REv. (Northwestern Univ.) 669 (1939). See also Eldredge, Varia-
tion on Libel Per Quod, 25 VAND. L. REv. 79, 92 (1972), for a discussion of 
liability without fault in the libel context. 
40. Henn, supra note 39, at 47 n.150; see Reed v. Melnick, 81 N.M. 608, 610, 471 P 2d 
178,180 (1970). 
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While the question has never been squarely presented in Mary-
land, there is a strong indication that, where proof of extrinsic 
facts is necessary to make out defamation, there must be knowledge 
imputed to the defendant of the defamatory connotation before 
there can be recovery.41 
Since the statement contained in Jacron and repeated in Piskor, 
that there must be proof of negligence to recover in defamation, 
was in implementation of the Gertz ban on liability without fault, 
it is a fair conclusion that it is, in fact, only to instances of liability 
without fault, i.e., defamation-by-extrinsic-fact unknown to the pub-
lisher. that the statements of the court of appeals are directed.4% 
41. See DeWitt v. Scarlett, 113 Md. 47, 56, 77 A. 271, 275 (1910): 
It can make no difference in principle what may be the words or charac-
ter employed. If they have acquired, among those to whom they are pub-
lished, a definite significance, and the publisher is aware of the construction 
that will be placed upon them, their actionable character must be deter-
mined accordingly. On the other hand, words cannot be given any other 
than their natural and ordinary meaning, unless it be alleged and proved 
that they were used and understood in a different sense. The one who 
publishes them, or causes them to be published, cannot complain if his 
words are judged by the sense in which they were used and in which he 
knew they would be understood, and it must be presumed that he intended 
them to mean what he knew those to whom they were published would 
understand them to mean. 
Judge Kaufman appears to take the other view, in Sauerhoff v. H earsl 
Corp., 388 F. Supp. 117, 121-22 (D. Md. 1974), re7ld on other grounds, No. 
75-1229 (4th Cir., June 10, 1976), a case very similar in its facts to Cassidy. 
Although a summary judgment was awarded to the defendant because no special 
damages had been proven, the court indicated, in dictum, its belief that a pub-
lished reference to the plaintiff and his girl friend might be defamatory if the 
plaintiff could show that there were those to whom publication was made who 
knew the plaintiff was married to someone else. Whether the defendant knew of 
the existence of the wife was not alluded to as relevant. See also Pace v. 
McGrath, 378 F. Supp. 140, 143 (D. Md. 1974). 
42. Before we conclude that Jacron and Piskor increase the obstacles a plaintiff 
alleging defamation must overcome to establish liability, we should consider the 
remarkable approach taken in Piskor as to what will suffice to show actual malice 
to defeat the common law conditional privilege there made out by the defendant. 
The court stated that an inference of actual malice might be drawn if the jury 
read the defendant's action as conveying "an imputation of theft," 277 Md. at 174, 
352 A.2d at 816. But such an imputation was necessary to establish the tort of 
defamation in the first place. Therefore, the court's holding would seem to make it 
easier to establish liability, and thus represents a return to the mistaken dicta of 
some cases that language defamatory on its face would support an award for puni-
tive damages (for which actual malice is normally required). Cf. Montgomery 
Ward & Co. v. Cliser, 267 Md. 406, 298 A.2d 16 (1972) ; American Stores Co. v. 
Byrd, 229 Md. 5, 181 A.2d 333 (1962) ; Simon v. Robinson, 221 Md. 200, 154 A.2d 
911 (1959); Shockey v. McCauley, 101 Md. 461, 61 A. 583 (1905); Newton v. 
Spence, 20 Md. App. 126, 316 A.2d 837 (1974). But see Afro-American Publish-
ing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1966); A.S. Abell Co. v. Barnes, 
258 Md. 56, 265 A.2d 207, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 921 (1970); Gambrill v. 
Schooley, 95 Md. 260, 52 A. 500 (1902); Fresh v. Cutter, 73 Md. 87, 20 A. 774 
(1890); Snyder v. Fulton, 34 Md. 128 (1871). It is difficult to reconcile this 
holding in Piskor with the general statement that liability without fault may not 
be imposed for defamation. 
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In those rare cases, negligence in ascertaining the true facts or in 
failing to ascertain that the asserted facts were false, would be a 
necessary ingredient of the tort if liability without fault were to 
be avoided. However, in the ordinary case, where, for example, 
the defendant calls the plaintiff a thief, unless the occasion was 
privileged it makes no sense to say that the plaintiff, to make out 
a prima facie case, must prove that the utterance was negligent. 
The utterance is patently a wrongful act, intended to injure the 
plaintiff.43 
There is a further consideration which compels the conclusion 
that defamation of private individuals has not simply become 
another branch of the law of negligence. Such a development would 
run directly counter to the principal underlying justification for 
an action for defamation. The tort serves an important social 
function by allowing a party whose reputation has been injured 
to seek vindication through a court determination that the words 
were unfairly injurious to his reputation. Many plaintiffs want 
such vindication, even in the absence of demonstrable damages. 
The valuable consequences of a plaintiff's verdict, even if only 
for nominal damages, have been widely recognized.44 If the tort of 
defamation is converted into a branch of negligence law, nominal 
damages presumably will no longer be available, since a negligence 
plaintiff cannot recover at all, however much he has established 
liability, unless he can show some actual damage.45 
Another troublesome statement by the court of appeals in 
Jacron and Piskor suggests that the plaintiff must now prove 
falsity in every case.46 Heretofore it has been a burden imposed 
43. The intention would exist whether the defendant meant to blacken the plaintiff's 
reputation, or, without wishing such a result, uttered words which he knew or 
should have known would have that consequence. 
44. Murnaghan, supra note 20, at 33 n.115, 35 n.117. 
45. E.g., Peroti v. Williams, 258 Md. 663, 671, 267 A.2d 114, 119 (1970): "Actual 
damages are a prerequisite for liability in negligence cases, and nominal damages, 
or 'technical liability' do not exist." See also Burns v. Goynes, 15 Md. App. 293, 
305,290 A.2d 165, 171 (1972), cert. dmied, 410 U.S. 938 (1973). 
The ALI recognizes in proposed comment c to § 569 of Tentative Draft 
No. 21 that, as a consequence of its establishment of a negligence test for lia-
bility, the availability of vindicating relief may be restricted. It lamely suggests 
as a correction for this undesirable consequence the development of a right to 
declaratory relief in lieu of the established right to nominal damages for un-
privileged defamation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory 
Notes § 621, at 81-85 (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975). Perhaps the ALI would 
have done better to have questioned the validity of a proposed rule that would 
lead to so unfortunate a result, rather than engage in attempts to legislate en-
tirely new concepts. 
46. General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 171, 352 A.2d 810, 815 (1976); 
Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 597, 350 A.2d 688, 698 (1975). 
The position of ALI Tentative Draft No. 21 on this aspect is, at best, very 
contradictory. In proposed § 582, it retains the existing language of the Restate-
ment: "The truth of a defamatory statement of fact is a complete defense to 
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on the defendant to plead and prove truth.47 Again, the general 
statement made by the court of appeals must be read in the light 
of the language in Gertz. The Supreme Court stated, in general 
discussion, that the common law defense of truth is not, standing 
by itself, sufficient protection for defendants desiring to exercise 
rights of free speech and free press. The Supreme Court went on 
to say that, consequently, there must be the restrictions discussed 
above on damage recoveries, and a requirement that there be no 
awards on a strict liability basis. It is not, however, appropriate 
to conclude that the Supreme Court was thereby holding that the 
burden of proving falsity must be shouldered by the plaintiff. 
The common law assigned the burden on the matter to the 
defendant for the very sensible reason that proof of a negative 
can be very difficult. Consider the case of a plaintiff objecting to 
the defendant's accusation that the plaintiff is a thief. It is well 
established that, although the charge is general, proof of a single 
instance of larceny will establish the truth thereof.48 To meet the 
burden of proving falsity, a plaintiff described as a thief would 
have to address himself to every transaction in which he had ever 
been involved and establish that, in each one, he acted in a manner 
that did not violate the larceny statutes.49 
an action of defamation .... " In the same breath, however, it eliminates the 
allocation of the burden on truth or falsity contained in that statement by limiting 
it to situations where "proof of falsity ... is not a requirement for a cause of 
action in defamation." The Reporter recognizes that the requirement that a 
private plaintiff show negligence, reckless disregard, or knowing falsity in fact 
places the burden of proving falsity on the plaintiff in all cases. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 582, comment b (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975); id., Explana-
tory Notes at 41. To compound the confusion, the Reporter adds a caveat to 
proposed § 613, dealing with burden of proof: "The Institutes [sic] takes no 
position as to whether the plaintiff or the defendant has the burden of proving 
the truth or falsity of a defamatory communication." 
47. E.g., Wetherby v. Retail Credit Co., 235 Md. 237, 241, 201 A.2d 344, 346-47 
(1964); Hagan v. Hendry, 18 Md. 177, 191 (1862). See MD. RULES 342, c.2(h). 
48. "Thus, the truth of a charge that another is an embezzler is proved by proof 
of a single act of embezzlement." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 582, comment b 
(1938). Tentative Draft No. 21 proposes some stylistic changes in this language, 
but leaves the substance unaffected. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 582, 
comment c (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975). 
49. That would make for unnecessarily long trials indeed, at a time when docket 
crowding and precedence of criminal cases make it increasingly difficult for civil 
matters to be reached at all. To resolve such a situation, the courts would 
doubtless follow either of two courses, both of which would essentially reallocate 
the burden on truth or falsity to the defendant: 
1. A plaintiff might be allowed to meet his burden simply by a general as-
sertion from the witness stand "that I have never committed a piece of thievery." 
That would add little to the like denial implicit in his having brought the case 
in the first place, and would effectively shift the burden to the defendant to 
develop specific instances of wrong-doing by the plaintiff. 
2. A plaintiff would undoubtedly be permitted by interrogatory or deposi-
tion to inquire as to any specific instance relied on by the defendant when he 
called the plaintiff a thief and the judges would probably hold that only those 
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The Supreme Court could hardly have intended such a result. 
Wherever defamation is apparent on the face of the words it will 
be preferable to leave the burden on the defendant to prove truth.50 
Although Jacron and Piskor state the proposition that the plaintiff 
must prove falsity flatly, and without apparent restriction, it is 
to be hoped that subsequent cases, dealing with actual situations 
of blatant defamation, will limit the rule to the situation of defama-
tion-by-extrinsic-fact. It is that situation which creates the poten-
tial for liability without fault that the court of appeals in Jacron 
and Piskor was concerned with preventing. It is not unreasonable 
to shift the burden of proving falsity to the plaintiff in the re-
stricted situation where he already must show that other facts, not 
contained in the publication, existed and were known both to the 
defendant and to his hearers or readers, which caused language 
innocent on its face to convey a defamatory meaning. 
Another reason against a general shifting of the burden of 
proof on truth or falsity from the defendant to the plaintiff is that 
the independent existence of the tort of defamation would there-
upon terminate. The recognized separate action for injurious (but 
not defamatory) falsehood allows recovery for misstatements of 
fact which are not defamatory, provided the plaintiff meets the 
burdens of (a) proving falsity and (b) establishing the existence of 
listed need be dealt with by the plaintiff in his proof of falsity. However, it is 
extremely questionable whether a rule of law should be adopted, the efficacy 
of which is entirely dependent on thorough resort by one of the litigants to 
discovery. Some plaintiffs might lack the wherewithal. Also, what good is dis-
covery to a bank teIler described as an embezzler, who, in answer to an inter-
rogatory, is told that the defendant was referring to every single transaction 
conducted by the plaintiff during his fifteen years with the bank? 
50. If the burden remains with the defendant, the prohibition against imposition of 
liability without fault should modify one common law concept, however. It has 
been ruled that an unsustained plea of truth, standing alone, without any other 
evidence of actual malice, wiII suffice (a) to support an award of punitive dam-
ages and (b) to overcome an established qualified privilege. Domchick v. Green-
belt Consumer Servs., Inc., 200 Md. 36, 45-48, 87 A.2d 831, 835-36 (1952). 
The requirement in Jacron and Piskor of knowing falsity or reckless disregard 
of truth to support a punitive damages award should eliminate the use of an 
unsustained plea of truth as a substitute for actual malice where exemplary 
damages are involved. 
Insofar as the possible destruction of a privilege defense through entering a 
plea of truth is concerned, it is inconsistent with the prohibition against liability 
without fault to make it a condition of a defendant's resort to a recognized 
defense that he thereby creates evidence against himself on the issue of liability. 
This is especiaIly so since the law generaIly encourages parties to present their 
cases without inhibition, by according an absolute privilege against a claim of 
libel based on any court pleading. Herring v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 21 Md. 
App. 517, 526, 321 A.2d 182, 187-88 (1974); DiBIasio v. Kolodner, 233 Md. 512, 
520-23, 197 A.2d 245, 249-51 (1964); Gore v. Condon, 87 Md. 368, 377, 33 A. 
261, 262 (1898) ; BartIess v. Christhilf, 69 Md. 219 (1888); ct. Picone v. Talbott" 
29 Md. App. 536, 545-47, 349 A2d 615, 620-21 (1975). 
42 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 6 
actual damage.51 If the plaintiff, where words are evidently de. 
famatory on their face, must still meet a burden of proving falsity, 
there will really be no significance attached to the defamatory 
character of the falsehood. Provable injury to reputation will be 
an element of damages, but, insofar as liability is concerned, the 
derogatory character of the falsehood will no longer constitute in 
any wayan element of the tort itself. 
Since the court of appeals was directing itself to redefining 
what it manifestly regarded as the continuing tort of defamation, 
its utterances on the subject should not be construed as eliminating 
the action by submerging it into the separate tort of injurious 
falsehood. 
The subject of common law privileges was also addressed by 
the court of appeals in Jacron. Commendably, the court recog· 
nized that privileged occasions do not exclusively occur where 
reasonableness of the defendant's conduct alone excuses the publi. 
cation of defamatory material. The public ends served by the 
judicial recognition of privileges are somewhat broader, 52 and neg-
ligence in their exercise will not destroy them. Actual malice must 
be shown by a plaintiff to overcome a privilege. Thus, the court 
of appeals concluded that the common law privileges remain avail-
able as defenses despite the casting of a burden of proving negli-
gence on the plaintiff. 
It is possible that Jacron and Piskor may, ultimately, be read as 
having really only added one more privilege for defendants, and 
otherwise as having left unchanged the common law rules as to 
liability for defamation. If, as is here suggested, the Jacron and 
Piskor cases should, insofar as rules of liability are concerned, be 
confined to the situations involving non-apparent defamation, i.e., 
51. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 128 (4th ed. 1971). 
For a time it was doubted in Maryland whether injurious falsehood was a 
separate tort, or only a special form of defamation. See Lehigh Chern. Co. v. 
Celanese Corp. of America, 278 F. Supp. 894 (D. Md. 1968); Hopkins Chern. 
Co. v. Read Drug and Chern. Co., 124 Md. 210, 92 A. 478 (1914). Later cases 
have, however, acknowledged the distinct nature of injurious falsehood. Shell 
Oil Co. v. Parker, 265 Md. 631, 291 A.2d 64 (1972); Beane v. McMullen, 265 
Md. 585,291 A.2d 37 (1972). 
52. In Walker v. D'Alesandro, 212 Md. 163, 169, 129 A.2d 148, 151 (1957), it was 
observed: "The basis for immunity from liability by reason of privilege is 
that a public or social interest is to be served by according the privilege .•.. " 
See also Orrison v. Vance, 262 Md. 285, 292, 277 A.2d 573, 576 (1971): "the 
policy, behind aU defamation privileges ..• [is] 'that some words need saying'." 
Stevenson v. Baltimore Baseball Club, Inc., 250 Md. 482, 243 A.2d 533 (1968), 
quotes approvingly a description of qualified privilege: 
If fairly warranted by any reasonable occasion or exigency, and honestly 
made, such communications are protected for the common convenience and 
welfare of society; and the law has not restricted the right to make them 
within any narrow limits. 
Id. at 486, 243 A.2d at 536, quoting Toogood v. Sprying, 1 C.M.&:R. 181, 193, 
149 Eng. Rep. 1044 (1834). 
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defamation-by-extrinsic-fact, and are read as merely insisting that 
there be no imposition of liability without fault, one may view the 
cases as actually creating a privilege. The privilege would allow 
a defendant to show that he was not unreasonable in his steps 
leading to publication of language actionable only by reference to 
extrinsic facts. This would make negligence in such situations an 
essential ingredient of the cause of action, albeit allocating the 
burden to the defendant, rather than to the plaintiff, where the 
court of appeals has asserted it should be. However, that would 
reduce the immediate appearance created by Jacron and Piskor, 
of radical surgery on the slowly built up common law of defamation, 
to the level of a mere lancing of a painful, but not menacing, boil. 
Among other things, it would harmonize the shifting of the burden 
of proving falsity to the plaintiff when the defamation is by ex-
trinsic fact. Whenever the defendant is able to establish that the 
occasion was privileged, by force of well established, long existing 
common law principles themselves, the burden of proving falsity 
shifts to the plaintiff.53 
CONCLUSION 
Jacron and Piskor signal a general reexamination of the com-
mon law of libel and slander, in the light of three guiding principles: 
1. Liability without fault may not be imposed. 
2. Compensatory damage awards must be limited to provable 
harm, but should not exclude non-pecuniary elements of provable 
harm, such as the injured feelings of the plaintiff. 
3. Damages intended to punish, rather than compensate 
(whether denominated punitive damages or general damages), may 
not be recovered in the absence of clear and convincing proof of 
knowing falsity on the part of the defendant, or its substantial 
equivalent, reckless disregard of truth. 
Despite general statements in Jacron and Piskor to the contrary, 
it is neither necessary nor prudent, except in the relatively infre-
quent cases of defamation-by-extrinsic-fact, to impose a burden 
on the private plaintiff to prove that the publication was (a) false 
and (b) negligent, as part of his basic attempt to establish com-
mission of the tort. Subsequent cases dealing with defamations 
evident from the face of the language declared on can be expected 
to find the tort made out by the proof of publication alone, and to 
leave the burden of proving truth on the defendant, unless he 
establishes a conditional privilege, whereupon, under established 
rules of the common law, the burden to prove falsity will shift to-
the plaintiff. 
53. See note 33, supra. 
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